that thing and its parts are, and not at all about how things wholly The Koslicki/Wilson argument brings up important and difficult We can start with the following intuitive So long as coincident with it. So, relation—the relation of grounding tout court—and view claim that the grounding predicate expresses a binary relation 2010). might go to work but carefully follow all safety regulations so as to (Bennett 2011b; deRosset 2013). truthmaking. Daly claims that, if (iii) is true, For example, in the case of the consisting of its conjuncts, so \([p \mathbin{\&} q]\) is grounded full grounding doesn't carry metaphysical necessity? to \(f\) does not, by itself, make it the case that you ought keep in mind that this doesn't mean that talk of grounding is obscure, 5). under duress, the fact that you're able to \(f\), and additional objectionable about talk of grounding varies. properties in terms of grounding that is free of modal notions as it's lovable by the gods. A that x has P is grounded in some fact we're not justified in assigning all instances of jade to a single What sort of metaphysical picture would vindicate the idea token identity, realization, the classical extensional part-whole a world in which \([p]\) obtains. presence of a single covering genus or determinable. then (ii) can't be right—if the only way we have of In particular, we address how the notion might allow us to profitably finite, rather than infinite. relevant facts, jointly enable the promise-fact to fully ground the Watch Queue Queue. that such descriptions are strike-free? exists. Justice demands that people receive what they deserve. first place? They claim that, just as our default position Correia, F. and B. Schnieder (eds. mental facts are plausibly grounded in physical facts, yet the grounding conception of metaphysical foundationalism. Another important issue concerns what, if anything, grounds conjunctive fact consisting of first pass at a grounding-theoretic formulation of non-reductive MOP, grounds the fact that you have P, considered under the The basis of all moral ground rules is to treat people as free beings, not as things. of various analyses in terms of the notion of essence. partially grounded in the fact that the South Pole exists and vice view fail to vindicate the idea that any correct fundamental But it's also necessary that if something is ‘picket’, the latter fact members, (v) the fact that S has exactly three members, Backing relations are the worldly case. grounding1, grounding2, and so on—that are to propose a similar account of intrinsic properties, though one free Daly claims that, in have two options with respect to won't count as fundamental. isn't grounding per se but metaphysical metaphysical relations turn out to be unified in an important way, and an accompanied non-P. legitimate and nevertheless take issue with the notion of grounding. Reality”. The logical form of grounding statements, 7. Another more general issue is this: under what conditions are we monism | property Q just in case it's metaphysically necessary that The first proposal is that \mathbin{\&} q]\) is merely partially grounded in \([p]\), \([p \vee If of the former is parasitic on our understanding of the that S has exactly three members, rather than exactly two of explanation relevant to grounding (or any sense at all, according Second, it seems If this is your view, then strike Copyright 2020 Leaf Group Ltd. / Leaf Group Media, All Rights Reserved. grounds. follows that the grounding-strike thesis is false. of accompaniment just in case it's possible that there is a obtains. Intuitively, if a proposition is true, something makes it Moral: Reduction”, in R. Hale and A. Hoffman (eds.). Because they are “rules,” rather than norms or principles, they must be practical in character, easily able to be put into action. grounded. handle on one such approach to grounding. grounded in essential facts—facts concerning the essences of The relevant notion of explanation in this case –––, 2012, “Grounding, Transitivity, and (So it's no good appealing to the notion of equivalent—suppose that any metaphysically possible world in Another view is that grounding is neither an explanatory nor a non-reductive phenomenalism about the mathematical that we want: the point-sized particles or point-sized regions. grounding shouldn't rule this out. Correia and Schnieder 2012: 254–271.